This article focuses on one of the many outcomes of the so-called \textit{rebranded philosophy of history}, namely, the continuity-discontinuity issue. Eelco Runia’s, Noël Bonneuil’s and Paul A. Roth’s conceptions of historical time will be analyzed as representative of this subject in the landscape of the theory of history from 2010 on. The authors sampled not only provide the evidence that historical discontinuity remains alive as a theoretical and historiographical challenge, but they also disclose different arrays to think the relationship among past, present, and future, and historical transformation. The concepts of historical time analyzed recall Foucault’s discontinuously-base model of thinking historical time and add to it different varieties of historical discontinuity. Moreover, the continuity-discontinuity issue in the new backdrop involves operation of translating time into space (spatialization of time). As a result, the discontinuously-based model of historical time’s main characteristics will be summarized and its strength as a heuristic tool for further analyses of the concepts of historical time is outlined.

\textit{philosophy of history – postnarrativism – discontinuity}
Este artigo enfoca um dos muitos resultados da chamada filosofia da história redefinidas, qual seja, a questão da continuidade-descontinuidade. As concepções de tempo histórico de Eelco Runia, Noël Bonneuil e Paul A. Roth serão analisadas como representativas deste assunto no panorama da teoria da história a partir de 2010. Os autores estudados não apenas fornecem evidências de que a descontinuidade histórica permanece viva como um desafio teórico e historiográfico, mas também revelam diferentes arranjos para pensar a relação entre passado, presente e futuro, bem como a transformação histórica. Os conceitos de tempo histórico analisados lembram o modelo de base descontínua de pensar o tempo histórico de Foucault, adicionando ainda a ele diferentes variedades de descontinuidade histórica. Além disso, a questão da continuidade-descontinuidade no novo pano de fundo envolve a operação de tradução do tempo no espaço (espacialização do tempo). Como resultado, as principais características do modelo baseado na descontinuidade do tempo histórico serão resumidas, assim como sua força como uma ferramenta heurística para análises posteriores dos conceitos de tempo histórico será ressaltada.
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN THE RECENT THEORY OF HISTORY: RETURN OF HISTORICAL DISCONTINUITY

The theory of history nowadays devises unprecedented horizons towards a “rebranded philosophy of history” (Simon 2019a, 78). The new trends of the philosophy of history deals with the epistemic mediations between historical experience and language, the approach to ethical issues (Rangel; Araujo 2015, 318-332), and to “a vast amount of work on historical time” that do not fit anymore the divide between narrativist and substantive philosophy of history (Simon 2019b, 61). Especially, the theoretical efforts to reconceptualize historical time imply that, according to Paul, “metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the historia res gestae are inevitable for anyone reflecting on historical thought.” (Paul 2015, 10).

This article starts from the so-called “new metaphysics of time” (Kleinberg 2012, 1), which reveals a renewed understanding about historical time that, in general, departs from the narrativist philosophy of history (Lorenz 2011). In fact, the metaphysics of historical time overshadows the outdated dichotomies between substantive and narrativist philosophy of history that goes along with the displacement of the recognized outlook of the theory of history. The established, yet exhausted, narrativism formed by different mixed lineages (analytical philosophy, post-structuralism, and theory of literature) since the 1970s and 1980s, retreats; whereas — after the 2000s —, “the philosophy of history is gradually moving toward a broadly understood postnarrativist stage and a period of renewed theoretical innovation.” (Simon; Kuukkanen 2015, 153). In contrast, the rising after-narrativism brings back issues that the historical realism had previously considered along with theoretical innovation, since the focus is now on experience rather than on linguistic aspects (Simon; Kuukkanen 2015, 155).

From this backdrop, the concept of historical time calls attention to the reframing of the relationship with the past:

some [philosophers of history] have sought to move beyond the emphasis on language and representation not by returning to a crude variant of objectivism or empiricism but by re-examining our relationship to the past and the past’s very nature and by attempting to construct a new metaphysics of time. (Kleinberg 2012, 1).

First of all, the new concepts of time “invoke a ‘speculative’ theory about the difference between past and present.” (Paul 2015, 11). The temporal difference between them focus on two related issues: (a) relationship between past, present, and future, and (b) change in history.

As for (a) the relationship between past, present, and future, the classical, yet frozen and postponed, continuity/discontinuity divide about historical time develops a new picture in the recent philosophy of history. The dissenting voices come from recent theorists of history that once again dismiss continuity as the archetypal image of historical time. For them, even after the linguistic and narrative turns, continuity remains being the supra summus that must be recovered in history and conceived of as the major endeavor that historians painstakingly pursue. To this effect, Runia’s, Roth’s, and Bonneuil’s concepts will be inspected as case studies concerning the alleged recovery of discontinuous time in historical theory. The three theorists provide not only the evidence that historical discontinuity remains alive nowadays as a theoretical and historiographical
challenge, but they also disclose diverse approaches to discontinuity that develop the seminal Foucauldian paradigm on discontinuity. Runia (2006) thinks discontinuity from the point of view of the literary theory; Roth (2012), from the renewed analytical philosophy of history; and Bonneuil (2010), from the unfamiliar — to the philosophers of history — mathematical thinking.

As for (b) change in history, the rebranded philosophy of historical time recovers an old-fashioned feature in the philosophy of history. Historical transformation, which had been drown out due to the risk of speculation, comes up again. The new concepts of historical time do not deal anymore with the idea that history has processual, continuous internal sense — either progress or degeneracy — that historians and philosophers diligently might track down. Instead, the question has changed to “whether it is possible to conceive of historical time in other than processual-developmental terms” (Simon 2019a, 72). Nevertheless, how can change over time be historically effective without experiencing continuous development or degeneracy? In fact, alternative temporalities come up to make sense of new, non-processual vectors of historical transformation. For instance, for Bevernage (2008), the presence of the past in the present allows for the vestiges of the past to be experienced in the present as vectors for transformation. According to Bonneuil (2010), instead, the mathematical thought teaches historians to conceive of transformation in history as simultaneous past processes without a leading principle of historical continuity. At any rate, the non-processual idea of historical time call upon a new look on historical discontinuity.

Thus, our main hypothesis is that the retrieval of the continuity/discontinuity issue in the recent concepts of historical time discloses new varieties of discontinuous historical time that expand the Foucauldian model from the 1960s. In fact, conceiving of historical time as either continuous or discontinuous (x) is primary with regard to the relationship between past, present, and future (a), and to the reconfiguration of historical transformation (b). Thus, in the next sections, the premise that (a) together with (b) is a function of (x) will show to hold good.

CRITERIA FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE DISCONTINUOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PAST: FOUCALT’S MODEL FOR HISTORICAL TIME

There are different relations with the past, but “the material relation precedes all other [epistemic, moral, political, aesthetic] ones [, since it] revolves around what the past does to people, rather than what people do with the past.” (Paul 2015, 34). According to Runia’s realistic view, which contends narrativism, the experience of the past does “not reside primarily in the intended story or the manifest metaphorical content of the text, but in what story and text contain in spite of the intentions of the historian.” (Runia 2006, 1). Likewise, Roth states that the historical “irrealism” rejects narrativism, for historical time is conceived of from the experience and representation of the past, which are both “socially mediated negotiations of a fit between descriptions and experience.” (Roth 2012, 313).
Furthermore, different material relations with the past vary according to whether the image of the relation between past, present, and future is continuous or discontinuous. Recent theorists of history show that discontinuity is not solely opposed to continuity as a kind of relationship to the past. It, additionally, releases varieties of the discontinuous historical time regarding the ways the past hits the present, the present recalls the past, and the present opens up to the future. These varieties are the speculative benefit that the rebranded philosophy of history brings about. For Runia, discontinuity is something whose reality is experienced retrospectively in the present (Runia 2006, 7-8). For Roth, experiencing the past implies taking into consideration that the description of the discontinuous pasts also depends on socially agreed discursive practices, which are also discontinuous (Roth 2012, 338-339). For Bonneuil, discontinuous pasts can be properly recovered if historians give up on the image that establishes a one-to-one relationship to the past in favor of describing the past as a set of discontinuous possibilities that surrounds a point-present (Bonneuil 2010, 31-32).

From these authors’ concepts of historical time, which will be discussed in detail, the question arises as to what kind of model of historical time we should turn to to identify and scrutinize the diverse new modes of discontinuous relationship between past, present, and future, and discontinuous transitional patterns of historical time, they convey.

In the 1960s, Foucault objected to the idea that the internal, continuous sense of history may explain discontinuity away. For Foucault, the significance of discontinuity to historical disciplines should primarily refuse the false and naïve assumption that discontinuity would be the irrational antipode of continuity, for “[there is] absolutely no question of substituting one category, the ‘discontinuous,’ [for the] no less abstract and general ‘continuous.’ I try to show to the contrary that discontinuity is not a monotonous and unthinkable void between events.” (Foucault 2001, 708). In fact, Foucault argues for a dynamical idea of discontinuity inasmuch as it allows for the description of continuous transformation in history, as “it is a set of specific transformations different from each other (each with its conditions, rules, and levels) and bonded together according to patterns of dependency. History is the descriptive analysis and the theory of its transformations.” (Foucault 2001, 708). The Foucauldian assumptions about discontinuity in history replaces the traditional model in which discontinuity took the irrational form of a gap that interrupts transformation, and therefore misses the internal sense of history as such, for a model in which discontinuity is the very form of change. In effect, according to Revel, Foucault understood that discontinuities can be described as a vector of transformation, if continuity, reciprocally, is redefined “as the ceaseless process of differentiation.” (Revel 2010, 44).

The Foucauldian challenge concerning discontinuity was eclipsed by the overwhelming image of Foucault as the prime representative of the postmodern historicism of a narrativist sort. (Pieters 2000, 21). The Foucauldian model of the discontinuity of historical time, nevertheless, lied dormant underground while Foucault starred in the poststructuralist, narrativist historical theory as the supporter of the maxim that what we take for historical truth is nothing else but language, discourse. The counter-image that Foucault, as a speculative philosopher of history put forth, aligns with the idea that he assumed a “principle of intelligibility” (Foucault 2003, 226-228) about the relation to the past based on discontinuity. This move sets up the basis for a Foucauldian historical theory that Fillion describes “as an articulation of what a renewed speculative
philosophy of history would need to consider to be relevant today.” (Fillion 2005, 48). In short, Foucault’s discontinuously-based model is the way that he himself theorized history to launch a new relationship between past, present, and future and to reframe the dynamic of historical change. Foucault did not wait for the post-post-structuralism to vindicate his philosophy of history and created on his own account a “default model” to theorize history, since he “refuses to engage in the general, speculative question as to whether there is a discernible particular dynamic [in history], but his thought does not preclude a speculative interest in identifying such a dynamic” (Fillion 2005, 62-63). In fact, the Foucauldian dynamic of history lied within the discursive analysis’ procedure that combines “object-sidedness and subject-sidedness [so as not] to commit to the metaphysically problematic notion of ‘facts’ and their separation from ‘non-facts’, as the narrativists, postmodernist and also historical realists typically seek to do.” (Kuukkanen 2015, 173).

The relationship with the past and the Foucauldian model of historical time, according to the previous discussion, will henceforth allow the characterization of the authors sampled as case studies to develop our hypothesis. We will see that the discontinuity of historical time (x) affects both the relationship among past, present, and future (a), and the transformation in history (b), by introducing different patterns of discontinuity that branches Foucault’s forerunner model.

THREE VARIETIES HISTORICAL DISCONTINUITY

If we take, on the one side, the Foucauldian model from the 1960s as the starting point to think historical time discontinuously, on the other side, it will become evident that the new theorists of historical time, with whom discontinuity is still at issue more than forty years later, open the way for the development of a new discontinuously-based model to think historical time.

Runia understands that “the unrepresented way the past is present in the present” (Runia 2006, 4) requires the recognition of the historical reality in a way that the narrativist-Whitean approach cannot handle. “Different levels” of past, which are simultaneous and discontinuous with the plan of the present, make historical reality effectively experienced (Runia 2006, 8). In favor of the realistic point of view, Runia’s historical discontinuity dismisses both the continuous meaning that lies in the depth of history (speculative philosophy of history), and the deconstruction of the mechanisms of creating continuity — narratives — that the poststructuralism encouraged: “Accounting for discontinuity requires addressing not primarily the question of how continuity is created, but how discontinuity is brought about.” (Runia 2006, 6). It is discontinuity that makes the “ontological drift” (Runia 2006, 26) of historical transformation and change effective and experienced, since it is not a vacuous time but the reality that the past imposes on the present:

because in history there is no equivalent for what the individual is the absolute discontinuity of death, historical discontinuity is always, I wouldn’t say relative, but irremediably bound up with continuity [therefore it focus] not on history as what is irremediably gone, but on history as ongoing process.(Runia 2006, 8).
From these assumptions, Runia restates the historical realism and bases it upon discontinuity. Hence, the Runian new variety of realism “has nothing to do with naïve historical realism” (Runia 2006, 23).

Roth’s account of historical time rejects both realistic and narrativist positions in the theory of history. According to Roth, knowing the past involves at once historical experience and the beliefs and the linguistic habits that allow historical experience to be represented. The categories that underlie the practices of historians melt together, for they are “socially mediated negotiations of a fit between descriptions and experience,” (Roth 2012, 313) as Foucault explained and practiced (Roth 2012, 333). Hence, changes in history can be neither realistically nor antirealistically explained (Roth 2012, 338-339). Discontinuity is a double-sided category, since the historical experience is rearranged by linguistic constructs which are in turn subject to change with history. As Roth’s discontinuity harasses both the empiricist realism and the narrativist antirealism, he appeals to the historical “irrealism” to rephrase the relationship with past: “Irrealism as I develop it also implies that how earlier and later times may influence one another remains at least partially indeterminate.” (Roth 2012, 316). On this basis, Roth’s irrealism, in fact, rebrands the philosophy of history by mixing the analytical philosophy of history emphasis on the linguistic construction of historical truth with the thesis on the discontinuous frame of historical time. If it is true that the concept of history is bound to the descriptions of historians make about the arrangement of events in time, these utterances cannot help bearing change that historical time imposes from outside language, since it requires that utterances about historical time shift along with history.

Bonneuil explicitly states that the reduction of discontinuity to continuity remains as an untouched historiographical operation, even after the poststructuralist raid during the narrativist era: “Even though radically criticized by Michel Foucault, the desire for continuity remains strong in historical writing.” (Bonneuil 2010, 30). From a mathematical point of view, he assumes that the approach to the continuity-discontinuity issue in history can be rehabilitate, should historical theory pay more attention to the unreasonable, though dominant point-to-point function (Bonneuil 2010, 34) concerning the relationship between present, past, and future, which disseminates “the illusion of a single past reported by one story conceals a multitude of pasts and futures in store at each moment.” (Bonneuil 2010, 46). The dismissal of the point-to-point narrativist-continuit function becomes possible by reconstructing the past according to a set-theoretical approach: “The function associating a point to a set is called a ‘set-valued map,’ or ‘point-to-set’ map,” or ‘correspondence.’” (Bonneuil 2010, 34). Bonneuil’s set-theoretically-based approach to historical time assumes that the past involves multilayered states that discontinuously correspond to a point in the present: “From the past, we can obtain sets of constraints that circumscribe sets of stories rather than a single scenario.” (Bonneuil 2010, 29). If each present-point includes a set of pasts, the diffusion of the past brings about “a whole set of present states” that opens up “a whole set of possible becomings” (Bonneuil 2010, 35) at the azimuth of historical time. The mathematical reasoning encourages historians to observe change in history as simultaneous past processes that are discontinuous with the present (Bonneuil 2010, 33-34).

Moreover, Bonneuil’s set-theoretically based philosophy of history does not dismiss continuity, since “in history, as in mathematics, connectedness [the continuity] results from a mental construction.” (Bonneuil 2010, 34). Provided that Bonneuil proposes that mental constructs are requirements to extract
continuity from the discontinuous historical time, he argues for a new kind of narrativism that assumes the mathematical thinking as a model for the philosophy of history. The former narrativism understood that the past can be built upon one-to-one correspondence that abridges and erases the gaps of discontinuity. In contrast, Bonneuil’s renewed narrativism constructs the continuum from the point-to-set correspondence that mentally rebuilds the discontinuity of the past by mapping it continuously upon the present.

These three instances, according to the new concepts of historical time previously presented, forks the Foucauldian model of thinking history discontinuously in three different tendencies, as follows:

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<th>AUTHORS</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Epistemic position</td>
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<td>Runia 2006</td>
<td>Renewed realism</td>
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<td>Roth 2012</td>
<td>“Irrealism” or renewed analytical philosophy of history</td>
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<td>Bonneuil 2010</td>
<td>Renewed narrativism</td>
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After characterizing three different branches of the Foucault’s model of historical discontinuity, it becomes consequent to throw a hindsight overview on the significance of Runia’s, Roth’s, and Bonneuil’s propositions for the rebranded philosophy of history. In short, the recovery of the continuity-discontinuity issue in the recent backdrop of the theory of history shall have unsettled the philosophy of history’s latent consensus about historical time. Most of all, the new philosophy of historical time renews the spatial patterns in which to frame historical time.

**Spatial Frames of Time and Historical Discontinuity**

The three selected authors that instantiate our sample of the new philosophy of historical time, when retrieving the problem of discontinuity in history, include themselves, to greater or lesser degrees, in the broader philosophical trend of the spatialization of time¹.

Runia goes straight to the point and shows that the spatialization of history catches historians and philosophers of history in the blind spot of their own disciplinary habits, as the relationship between time and space is often ignored in the treatment of the continuity-discontinuity issue: “writers fascinated by the problem of continuity and discontinuity have translated time into space. Some of the most perceptive of them were novelists and wayward geniuses who have not been taken very seriously by historians and philosophers of history”. (Runia 2006, 10, emphasis added). Translating time into space means that an event is transposed from a past place to discontinue the present by contiguity. Discontinuity is materially, not metaphorically, experimented as “an out-of-place-ness.” (Runia 2006, 16). What the historical narrative describes, therefore, is the reality of being out of place and to drift along with change that the living discontinuity of the experienced past entails.

For Roth, the spatialization of time appears in history as the “possibility-space.” (Roth 2012, 313). The historical discontinuity, thereby, lies in the displacement of the space of possibilities, since the practices of description of the community of historians make indeterminate the very actions attributable to an individual in the past (Roth 2012, 332). The space of possibilities is essentially open and displaceable, since “events can justifiably be said to have taken place at a time changes over time.” (Roth 2012, 339). While continuities are “constituted by a historian” (Roth 2012, 321) and, consequently, flatten the space of possibilities, pasts are multiple and discontinuous in themselves and with regard to the present, because “how earlier and later times may influence one another remains at least partially indeterminate. Indeed, a coherent account of why our future remains undetermined at least in some respects also presumes a past that remains open.” (Roth 2012, 339) As discontinuity makes the relation

¹ We will approach the spatialization in history as a philosophical problem, but spatialization in literary studies is also an interesting issue, see ASEGÜINOLAZA, Fernando Cabo. The Spatial Turn in Literary Historiography. *Comparative Literature and Culture*. Vol. 13, No. 5, 2011. Although our sample is the philosophy of history shows that the spatialization of time is an up-to-date issue, it is controversial in the analytic metaphysics of time; see SIDER, Theodore; HAWTHORNE, John; ZIMMERMANN, Dean W. (eds.). *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008.; POIDEVIN, Robin Le; *Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
between past-present-future undetermined, it unrealizes past into the surrounding possibility-space.

Bonneuil’s mathematics of time in history also stems from the spatialization of time. He thinks that the mathematical notion of “state space,” (Bonneuil 2010, 29) if conveniently transposed to the philosophy of history, solves the relationship between “the state space of past reality” and the “virtual space of historiography.” (Bonneuil 2010, 24). The isomorphic correspondence between them, namely, the accomplishment of the point-to-point function between an event in the past and the storytelling that accounts for it is an ideal, but idle, ambition for historians to pursue as it is for mathematicians (Bonneuil 2010, 34). The narrative falls short of assigning continuity to past realities because the past is elusive to its being continuously told, since “continuity is merely a façade, for the past could be ‘clearly discontinuous,’ like an avalanche.” (Bonneuil 2010, 31). In effect, the narrativist efforts shall allow “the continuity of present-day reality to be brought into contact with the discontinuity and surprises of historical reality.” (Bonneuil 2010, 31). According to Bonneuil, the continuous-discontinuous relationship between past and present is more accurately represented by a “point-to-set map” of historical time. In the historical map, the present-point is a moving place in the continuity of later times, whereas the set reunites the possible pasts that best describe the process of present-becoming-past in earlier times. Thus, the mapping of the relationship between past and present, “subject [history] to random deviations, [for] a set-valued process inherently embraces a whole range of possible fates” (Bonneuil 2010, 35) in the state space of history.

In short, the idea that time can be translated into space appears in the authors analyzed, even though from different perspectives. Runia refers to the physical space itself as a dimension of reality. Roth and Bonneuil deal with a logical and a mathematical image of space. Nevertheless, they understand time through a spatial frame that could be all be classified as types of spatialization of history.

If the Foucauldian model, according to the previous account, can be fairly understood as the standard from which the theorists of historical time Runia, Roth, and Bonneuil develop, by their own means, approaches to historical discontinuity, it is Foucault whom we find again as the standpoint that reveals a new approach to the spatialization of historical time. Indeed, he offers a spatial model to reframe the conception of historical time, since “space itself has a history in Western experience, and it is not possible to disregard the fatal intersection of time with space.” (Foucault 1986, 22). For Foucault, moreover, the spatialization of time is not only a theoretical issue, but also it is the very mode of experiencing history:

The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity; we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed […] One could perhaps say that certain ideological conflicts animating present-day polemics oppose the pious descendants of time and the determined inhabitants of space. (Foucault 1986, 23).
Mapping-out historical time in space is the symptom of the overcoming of an epistemological threshold. The emerging *episteme*, which rearranges the experience of time, brings consequences to the spatialization of history. Past and present, says Foucault, “appear as juxtaposed, set off against one another, implicated by each other,” (Foucault 1986, 22) consequently, the “manner of dealing with what we call time and what we call history” (Foucault 1986, 22) also changes.

**Final Remarks**

Although many historians recognize time as primary to historical knowledge, the focus on the concept of historical only increased from the 1990s on (Gorman 2013; Lorenz 2017). This article explored some aspects of this increasing trend that encourages with a renewed interest in the philosophy of history.

The three-instanced sample based on Runia’s, Roth’s and Bonneuil’s theories of historical time, from which we portrayed emergent concepts of time in the historical theory, showed to be consistent with the Foucauldian discontinuously-based model of historical time. According to this model, discontinuity is not the irrational void that breaches and ruins historical continuity. It is instead the element that requires from continuity the reconfiguration of historical time and change. The three new varieties of discontinuity are representative of the post-Second World War “evental temporality”, which may blend in different degrees with the continuous “processual temporality” that typified the older, though remaining sensibility about historical change (Simon 2019a, 80-81). Moreover, our authors’ concept of historical time revealed to be symptomatic of a epistemic change in the theory history as they develop the Foucauldian model and bring about innovative epistemic positions with regard to the previous narrativist and realistic backdrop. In fact, as observed, the discontinuously-based model of historical time branches out three epistemic varieties: Runia’s renewed realism, Roth’s irrealism or renewed analytical philosophy of history, and Bonneuil’s renewed narrativism.

Furthermore, the model brought consequences for the spatialization of time, that is, to think history spatially. The three sampled authors’ approaches concerning discontinuity provided different spatial frames for historical time: Discontinuing the present by the contiguity of the past according to Runia, setting out the discontinuous space of possibilities in history as Roth requires, and Bonneuil’s mapping historical time out of the mathematical discontinuous state space.
In short, the new model of historical time presents four dimensions:

[a] It is based on a renewed, rational concept of discontinuity that does not flirt with the irrationality of the previous idea of discontinuity as the vacancy of continuity.

[b] It presents, at least, three varieties of historical discontinuity: Runia’s realistic discontinuity, Roth’s irrealistic discontinuity, and Bonneuil’s narrativist discontinuity.

[c] It locates discontinuity in the centre of the spatialization of historical time according to three spatial frames: Runia’s space of historical contiguity, Roth’s space of possibilities in history, and Bonneuil’s historical mapping of the state space.

First of all, the discontinuously-based model of historical time proved to nicely hold three concepts of historical time. Secondly, the model seems to be inclusive enough as to apply to many a case study of discontinuous historical time. It may also disclose counterfactually new varieties of continuous historical time, since the latter fuses with the discontinuous varieties in different degrees due to the dynamics of historical change.

Consequently, it might be heuristically and exegetically productive to trace, prospect and analyze the varieties of historical time in the recent theory of history. For instance, our inquiry on the new concepts of time allows to detail Bevernage et al.’s (Bevernage et al. 2019, 406) metrics of the theory of history’s disciplinary transformation, according to which the “bibliometric assessment of research in the philosophy of history” shows that three different keywords master the research on historical theory successively: “religion/theology/secularization” (1945-1969), “Marxism/historical materialism/socialism” (1970-1984), and “narrativism/narratology” (1985-2014) (Bevernage et al. 2019, 419). In these three periods, coming in the second or third place behind the leading keyword, “*time/temporality* refers to the discussions on the nature of historical time and to notions of time and temporality in writings on the past.” (Bevernage et al. 2019, 420). In the third period, the mentions to historical time are the second most mentioned keyword and follows closely the leading narrative category. About these statistical data, Bevernage and al. inferred that the coincidence “is not really surprising since Ricoeur has pointed out that it is difficult to reflect on historical time without narrative and vice versa.” (Bevernage et al. 2019, 431). The authors of the bibliometric analysis go as far as to point out the rising of a fourth period in the historical theory that the last years of the third period apparently disclose. The ultimate period is related to keywords such as “historical consciousness,” “ethics,” and “violence-genocide.”(Bevernage et al. 2019, 434).

If it is true, on the one hand, that the emerging philosophy of history is related to historical consciousness, ethics, and trauma (Bevernage 2008, 149-167) in the fourth period of the theory of history, the concepts linked to the discontinuous time inspected in this article, on the other, disclose instead a coexisting scenario. It makes the fourth period anticipated by Bevernage et al. more complex. Actually, the mismatch between Bevernage et al.’s general bibliometrics of the recent historical theory and our small sample on the new concepts of historical time indicates that the keyword “time/temporality” remains to be measured apart in order to reveal the scenario that it prospects. Our inquiry on the concepts of historical time showed to be, indeed, an independent variable, and it shall perform in the future a detection test for the theory of history. Our hypothesis is that any keyword that may be ruling the
theory of history’s dataset, implies historical time, and not the other way around, for “history is the science of men in time.” (Bloch, 1953, 3).

Moreover, the spatialization of historical time that we observed in our sample of new concepts of historical time sets consequences back in the history of philosophy as to revolve the recognized pattern of the philosophy of history. In the long run, the Foucauldian discontinuously-based spatialization of time and its recent varieties displace the prevalent spatialization of time that Heidegger’s Being and Time relied on. From the perspective of the Foucauldian model, therefore, the postnarrativist concepts of time turn over older layers of the philosophy of history. These concepts amplify the deviation, which Foucault started, from the Heideggerian spatialization of time. The reassessment of the Heideggerian historicity and its remnants in the recent theory of history is just one of the issues that the rebranded philosophy of history urges us to carry out.

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